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Iran-Uzbekistan Relations in the Regional 
Security Context
Guli Yuldasheva
This article examines Iran-Uzbekistan relations within the regional security context, 
and the new efforts undertaken in 2019 to solve the security problems via bilateral 
and regional multinational institutions. It argues that the aggravation of the existing 
security situation, including geopolitical tensions in the region, contributes to the 
consolidation of the Iran-Uzbekistan partnership. The anti-Iran measures facilitate the 
process of reintegrating the region along the historical lines as part of the response to 
the growing global challenges. There are signs of positive regional dynamics, which 
can further boost Iran-Uzbekistan cooperation, and presuppose future regional 
connectivity among all pacified neighbors.
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Introduction
The process of forming a new global and regional system of international 
relations, started in the 1990s, has been greatly prolonged and aggravated by the 
never-ending geopolitical tensions, interstate conflicts and proceeding regional 
instability. Security and economic interests of the Central Asian states, in this 
context, naturally force them to become more pro-active about solving their 
problems without looking back at the competing global powers.
This is especially typical regarding the regional states, such as Iran and 
Uzbekistan. These states are located in strategically important regions of the 
Middle East and Central Asia, respectively. They are forecasted to play an 
important role in the transfer of energy in the future new geoeconomic system. 
Their potential roles in the ongoing Sunni-Shia conflicts are also of high 
importance.
The relations between the two states are facing a difficult situation as a 
result of such challenges and threats as geopolitical tensions, militarization of 
the region, growth of terrorism and drug trafficking. Moreover, they could not 
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invest heavily in their weak economies nor bring about the realization of regional 
transport-transit projects. Both sides have apparently come to the rational 
conclusion that under no circumstances should the long-lasting geopolitical 
tensions in the region hamper their mutually beneficial partnership, as it will 
positively affect the regional security and economic condition.
The results and consequences of the development of these tendencies are not 
quite clear yet. Thus, this article aims to explore the issue by describing the two 
states’ interests, revealing the geopolitical realities and Iranian-Uzbek responses 
to them, and discussing the security condition and mutual partnership in Central 
Asia. Doing so, the article attempts to provide a general picture of the outcomes 
of this regional cooperation and its great potential.
 
Review of the Related Literature
Iranian-Uzbek relations have been mostly studied indirectly and briefly in various 
studies that deal with Islam (Esposito 1992; Mohaddessin 2001; Mishku 2016) 
and the political development of Central Asia (Hunter 1996; Ferdinand 1994).
The role and place of Iran and the region of Central Asia in the system of 
regional international relations is reflected in a series of local and foreign works 
on geopolitics, security, and international relations. For instance, the Iranian-
Central Asian issue has been partly touched through revealing geopolitical 
interests of these states (Dugin 1999; Brzezinski 1997), or through dealing with 
Iranian policy in Central Asia in general (Nanay 1998; Khaidarov 1996; Wastnidge 
2017; Mohsen 2016). American specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, Kenneth 
Katzman (2019) mainly concentrates on Iran’s foreign and defense policies, and 
only briefly touches Iranian-Uzbek relations.
Among major works on the theme, one can mention the extensive chapter 
in the Vladimir Mesamed’s (2010) book, devoted to Iranian policy in Central 
Asia. The author provides a thorough analysis of the history of Iran-Uzbekistan 
relations, their trade-economic, and cultural and transport partnership as well as 
the political dialogues conducted during the first ten years after the independence 
of Uzbekistan.
The issue is also examined in the author’s monographs (Yuldasheva 2006, 
2017) and a series of articles (Yuldasheva 2018) written on the U.S.-Iran relations 
within the Central Asian context. These books examine the issue through the 
prism of geopolitical impact of the U.S.-Iran confrontation on Central Asia, and 
the articles analyze new approaches and trends in the bilateral relations after 2014 
and the rise to power of the new administration in Uzbekistan.
In contrast, this article, for the first time, examines Iranian-Uzbek relations 
within the regional security context as well as the new efforts undertaken in 2019 
to solve the security problems via bilateral and regional multinational institutions. 
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It covers the latest data on the bilateral contacts and international situation 
around Central Asia.
Converging Interests
There are objective factors for Iranian-Uzbek rapprochement: territorial, religious, 
cultural and linguistic closeness as well as similarity of some socio-economic 
problems such as unemployment and inflation.
At the end of 2018, Iran ranked 27th in the World list of the biggest 
economies in the world. Its GDP was worth over US$ 454 billion (IRNA 2019b). 
As to Uzbekistan, in the first half of 2019, its real GDP growth increased to 5.8 
percent, which is expected to increase to 6 percent in 2021(World Bank 2019). 
Thus, the two countries can fruitfully complement each other. 
Iran has fundamental interests in the Central Asian region, and receives 
Uzbekistan’s support in ensuring security and stability in Central Asia, which 
is inextricably linked with such issues as (1) addressing the current situation 
in Afghanistan; (2) strengthening the region’s status through common geo-
economic projects; and, (3) ensuring that Iran will play the role of a “gatekeeper” 
in Central Asia, serving as a transit route for oil and gas pipelines and transport 
networks.
The Uzbek stance is exhibited in (1) the policy of Uzbekistan on securing 
regional good-neighborliness and formation of the stability and security belt 
around the region of Central Asia; (2) neutrality of Tashkent in the Iranian-
American conflict; and, (3) consolidation of ties between Iran and the leading 
regional actors in Central Asia-Russia, China, Turkey and India.
However, these interests face various obstacles and security challenges due 
to continuation of the geopolitical tension around the region. Obviously, most 
important among them include the continuation of the U.S.-Iran confrontation, 
United States-European Union disagreements, appearance of contradictory 
trends in the two areas adjacent to the Central Asian region (Persian Gulf and 
Eurasian space), aggravation of the security sphere which includes growth of 




Confrontation between the United States and Iran forms the background of all 
emerging trends in the international life. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper has 
acknowledged that the United States and some of its allies have different attitudes 
toward this issue. However, he has stressed that Trump is determined to stay on 
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his course of “maximum pressure” through economic sanctions (Aljazeera 2019). 
This stimulates changes in geopolitical preferences of some states to withstand the 
growing challenges in political and economic life. One can mention, for instance, 
fluctuations of the European states between the United States and Asian states, 
the growing geopolitical split between the pro-U.S. and other Gulf states, and the 
growing cooperation of the Eurasian states, including Iran, under the aegis of 
China and Russia.
United States-European Union (EU) Relations
U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision last year to withdraw from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and renew sanction policy against 
Iran deepened the U.S.-European long-term discrepancies. To preserve the 
nuclear deal, the EU leaders, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, have 
been attempting to salvage the JCPOA, to reduce the international tension 
and return to dialogue between Washington and Tehran. However, despite all 
official rhetoric, the European position is shaky due to its fragmented state and 
dependence on the United States. Almost all large European firms had to be 
withdrawn from the Iranian market, depressing the economy still further. Efforts 
made at the G7 Summit in Biarritz on August 24–26, 2019 by French President 
Emmanuel Macron to reconcile Iran and the United States, in fact, failed. 
As a result, trade between Iran and EU member states from January to 
September 2019 stood at EUR€ 3.86 billion, to register a 74.92 percent plunge 
compared with last year’s corresponding period (Financial Tribune 2019). It is 
clear that this situation negatively affects regional cooperation, reducing financial 
involvement of European companies in projects wherein Iranian participation is 
present. Particularly, this decreases the flow of the transport routes towards the 
Persian Gulf, the shortest and economically viable route for Uzbek commodities 
to the world markets.
The Persian Gulf 
The direct response to the United States’ unilateralism was the crisis of 2019. 
The crisis developed in the Persian Gulf, with the escalation of military tensions 
between Iran and the United States (e.g., incidents in May and June 2019), 
following the deployment of substantial military assets to the Persian Gulf by 
U.S. President Donald Trump. Such deployment was allegedly due to the U.S. 
intelligence suggesting a planned “campaign” by Iran and its allies against the U.S. 
forces and interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq.
The prolonged Gulf crisis resulted in the division of the regional states into 
two groups: those who support the United States (Saudi Arabia and its allies) and 
those who are inclined to cooperate with Central Asian and other Eurasian states.
Such situation is not favorable for realization of economic projects connected 
with the Gulf-Chabahar project including transport corridors among Uzbekistan, 
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Turkmenistan, Iran, Oman, and Katar to name just a few. This also turns China 
into the main investor and transit route for Central Asian commodities, resulting, 
for instance, in the start-up of the Tashkent-Andijan-Osh-Erkeshtam-Kashgar 
corridor and the China-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway corridor. This 
one-sided foreign preference comes into collision with the Uzbekistan multi-
vector policy which favors the diversification of transport and economy links.  
Eurasia
In its turn the Gulf crisis consolidates cooperation of all Eurasian1 states, including 
Iran, under the aegis of China and Russia to protect themselves in economic and 
political spheres from the unpredicted unilateral actions by the United States. 
Russia and China declared the demand “to strengthen global strategic stability” 
and cooperate at their respective Ministry of Defense levels (Stefanovich 2019). 
Moreover, while traditional Gulf allies were in some confusion (Cunningham 
2019) presidents of Iran, Turkey and Russia activated their cooperation. During 
the fifth round of the Russia-Turkey-Iran summit on Syria held in Ankara on 
September 17, 2019, the sides agreed steps to ease tensions in Syria’s Idlib despite 
their lingering differences.
In their turn, Tehran and Beijing signed an agreement in their twenty-fifth 
year of comprehensive strategic partnership. And for the first time after the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, Iran participates in a regional organization, the Free Trade 
Area of the Eurasian Economic Union, which it officially joined on October 27, 
2019.
Additionally, Tehran is gradually strengthening its relations with the Central 
Asian states. It is also worth mentioning that a special envoy of Iran’s Supreme 
Leader, Head of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations Kamal Kharazi was in 
Tashkent from the end of April to the beginning of May 2019. On September 12, 
Iranian leaders also visited Kyrgyzstan to discuss regional security issues.
Strong opposition by Central Asian and other regional states to unilateralism 
in today’s world politics and its negative outcomes have driven states to actively 
participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO 
members are determined now to use the combined potential of regional states, 
international organizations, and multilateral unions to form a safe, open, and 
mutually beneficial and equitable space in Eurasia. The Bishkek SCO summit on 
June 14, 2019 acknowledged the organization as “an effective and constructive” 
mechanism for promoting multilateral cooperation that plays an important 
role in maintaining regional peace and stability. For example, the SCO member 
states resolutely condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and urge 
the international community to boost global cooperation in the fight against 
the scourge under the United Nations’ (UN) central role and through the 
implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Presstv.com 2019). 
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Security, among other considerations, led Uzbekistan to enter the Turkic 
Council (Gazeta.uz 2019a), which has served as an efficient mechanism for 
fighting against terrorism, drugs and human trafficking.
However, on the flipside, the U.S. minister of trade, Wilbur Ross, noted that 
entering Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) can complicate Uzbekistan’s entrance 
to the World Trade Organization (Gazeta.uz 23 2019b). This further complicated 
by the fact that China, the biggest trade partner of Uzbekistan and Iran, is in real 
economic war with the United States.
At the same time, the U.S. sanctions reduce the scope of the regional business. 
For instance, the Iranian government has ambitious goals like modernizing 
its Chabahar port, the nominal capacity of which is intended to be increased 
to eighty-six million tons by 2024 (Sawhney CSIS). It is projected that via the 
constructed Chabahar-Zahedan railroad and Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran 
railway corridor, Chabahar port can be connected with the transport system of 
the Caspian. Realization of such an ambitious project will put India, the main 
Chabahar sponsor, and Iran in the epicenter of the ongoing geo-economic 
processes in the Middle East, Central, and South Asia. In other words, the project 
is gaining momentum, and will eventually turn into one of the largest trade routes 
in the world.
In this context, the United States seems to have chosen a cautious regional 
stand, not hampering too much to the Chabahar project and leaving the door 
open to potential U.S. involvement into regional projects in future. This can 
be explained by the growing Chinese regional power and in contrast to it, U.S. 
intentions to preserve its partnership with India, the main U.S. South Asian 
ally and a potential conductor of U.S. strategy in Central Asia via the still not 
forgotten American New Silk Road initiatives. 
Hence, there is a real geopolitical struggle ongoing in and around Central Asia 
that deepens the instability of international relations and incites counteractions 
in the political and economic spheres that seriously hampers productive regional 
cooperation.
Security Situation
Geopolitical tensions resulted in various challenges and threats to the regional 
cooperation. Particularly, Iran’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and two phases of 
Iran’s reduction of its nuclear commitments as well as Tehran’s declarations on 
possibility of further reducing Iran’s obligations within the JCPOA’s framework 
have significantly increased potential for nuclear race and military conflicts in the 
world. Iran has taken these measures in response to the unilateral U.S. policy and 
Europe’s lack of efficient actions against the U.S. sanctions.
The regions and powers, neighboring or having stakes in Central Asia, 
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have been strengthening their military power. According to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2018, military expenditures of 
all twenty-nine members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been US$ 
963 billion or 53 percent of all world expenditures. Since 2010, the United States’ 
military spending increased 4.6 percent (SIPRI 2019), and in 2019 it amounted 
already US$ 725.5 billion (Zarubejnoe voennoe obozrenie 2019). China’s military 
spending is second increasing by 5 percent to US$ 250 billion in 2018, and Russian 
expenses were US$ 61.4 billion. Six out of the ten countries which had the biggest 
share of the military expenditures in their GDP in 2018 were from the Middle 
East (SIPRI 2019).
Simultaneously, the disbalance of interests among the main international 
actors and the concentration of their attention on solving their discrepancies 
led to the growth of terroristic acts in proximity to Central Asia, e.g. activation 
of such radical formations as Taliban, Haqqani Network, Da’esh as well as Al 
Qaeda and its proscribed affiliates. According to the Global Terroristic Index 
assessments, the states with the highest indexes of terrorism are Afghanistan 
(9.603), Iraq (9.241), Syria (8.006), and Pakistan (7.889) (Global Terrorism Index 
2019). According to the UN report, from 2,500 to 4,000 representatives of the 
Islamic State movement operate in Afghanistan (Central.asia-news 2019).  
Terrorism, in its turn, is known to be financially supported through drug 
trafficking. Uzbekistan is a northern transit route of opiates and heroin from 
Afghanistan to Russia and Europe. This trend is becoming increasingly permanent 
due to the prolonged clash of interstate interests and use of clandestine activities 
and unofficial tools by some actors to protect their own interests. In 2018 alone, 
263,000 hectares were sowed with opium poppies in Afghanistan. The recent 
seizure and burning of more than one tons of drugs in Uzbekistan could be one 
of the outcomes of this condition (Bashlayev 2019).
This unpredictable and complex situation diverts attention from peaceful 
projects and instead focuses forces, energy, and resources to reducing these 
security challenges and threats.
Iranian-Uzbek Partnership
Paradoxically, the anti-Iranian measures only renewed mutual interest and 
contributed to the process of reintegrating the region along the historical lines as 
part of the response to the growing global challenges. Thus, Iran and Uzbekistan 
are looking for efficient ways to restore and strengthen their lost links bilaterally 
and within the regional networks.
In particular, a special envoy of Iran’s Supreme Leader and Head of the 
Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, Kamal Kharazi, was in Tashkent from 
the end of April to the beginning of May 2019. The parties discussed bilateral 
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and regional issues, focusing on the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat 
railway and the implementation of the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman 
transport corridor agreement. The sides want to increase the number of the 
container shipments along this route. Tehran considers Uzbekistan to be the most 
strategically important and shortest transit, connecting the region to China and 
other Eastern Asian states. And, vice versa, Tashkent considers Iranian routes the 
shortest and most economically viable ones to the world markets. 
To promote such relations, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, speaking 
at the SCO summit in Bishkek on June 14, 2019, called for the development of the 
SCO Cooperation Strategy for the development of interconnectedness for efficient 
economic and transport corridors (Podrobno.uz 2019a). Correspondingly, on July 3, 
2019, the Uzbek governmental delegation headed by the Prime-Minister Abdulla 
Aripov visited Mazari-Sharif (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan 2019) with the aim of invigorating Uzbek-Afghan trade relations.
Concurrently, Tehran, inclined to develop strong partnership among Muslim 
states, strives to promote more active partnership with Uzbekistan within the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). It is expected, for instance, that Iranian 
side will participate in the second summit of the OIC on science and technology 
in 2020 in Tashkent. To strengthen this potential partnership, Tehran suggests the 
restoration of Islamic civilization center in the territory of Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan is against any military conflicts in the close regional neighborhood 
and supports Russian and Indian’s stance on Iran. In the interests of its economic 
and social security Tashkent is interested in promoting the realization of such 
existing projects, like Chabahar, with Iran. The sanction policy around the region 
has negatively affected and slowed reforms, reducing the flow of investments 
into the country. This is especially troubling now that Tashkent is trying to 
further consolidate economic partnership with all major powers, regional states, 
and international institutions and relies greatly on regional peace, support, and 
financial-technical assistance.
In these circumstances, to peacefully solve the emerging tense situation 
around Iran, Tashkent also supports the idea of creating joint commission on 
JCPOA. At the same time Tashkent is ready to use INSTEX2 financial mechanism 
in cooperating with Iran. However, in order to initiate such cooperation, Tehran 
would first need to fulfill its obligations on the nuclear program.
Positive Outcomes of Regional Cooperation
In response to the sanction policy, Iran is active in various regional initiatives, 
like EEU, Astana summit among Iran, Turkey, and Russia; summit among Iran, 
Azerbaijan, and Russia; as well as, among Iran, India, and Afghanistan. Achieving 
mutual understanding, consensus, and some level of partnership on the burning 
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regional issues naturally contributes to peace and stability around Uzbekistan 
and creates favorable circumstances to deepen further bilateral Uzbekistan-Iran 
relations and within the regional organizations.
To judge the efficiency of the undertaken regional efforts let’s turn to their 
immediate outcomes. During the last years, Iran has proved its peaceful oriented 
policy by absence of propaganda or terroristic acts and by its recent peacekeeping 
operations in Syria. To reduce the regional tension, Tehran continues to keep 
a patience stance and, in favor of stability, tries to find common language with 
regional powers. Thus, Iran’s President, Dr. Rouhani admits:
Iran, Turkey and Russia have been able to take good steps in establishing peace and 
security and fighting terrorism in Syria… The three countries’ agreement prevented 
bloodshed in Idlib from breaking out and we hope that the Astana process, along with 
Geneva process, can achieve full success (Mehr News 2018).
Other Gulf states are also increasingly predisposed to deepen their cooperation 
with historically, religiously, and culturally close Central Asian states. Some Gulf 
states are too pragmatically minded to reject Iran from the regional cooperation. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Qatar, Oman, and Arab Emirates are starting 
economic projects with Central Asian states, participated by Iran, and are 
obviously interested in realization of Chabahar project and its offshoots such as 
future North-South corridors able to join their states with other Eurasian states 
(Mehr News 2019).
On the whole, seventeen countries expressed their willingness to contribute 
to the development of Chabahar project in the south of Iran. Uzbekistan has 
repeatedly announced its economic interest in this project, and its potential 
trans-Afghan offshoots to gain access to the Gulf and further to the Asian and 
European markets.
Moreover, India, the main Chabahar’s investor, proposed to double trade 
with Iran in the next five years from the current level of US$ 13.8 billion, and 
Indian Trade between India and Iran increased to US$ 13.8 billion over 2017 and 
2018 from US$ 12.9 billion in the previous fiscal (Iranreview 2018).
Simultaneously, Iran and Azerbaijan signed very important agreements on 
the Caspian area and started cooperation in the field of oil and gas exploration 
and transit, as well as Astara-Astara railroad line (Iran.ru 2019). Trade exchanges 
between both states achieved 70 percent increase, grounds are prepared now to 
promote mutual cooperation in the fields of auto-making and industry and boost 
sea collaboration with Azerbaijan (IRNA 2019f).
The leading regional power, China, which is the first trade partner of 
Uzbekistan with US$ 3895.5 million of trade turnover from January to June 2019 
(State Committee 2019) and the main Iranian economic partner, invested in 
Iranian energy sphere about US$ 280 billion and, hence, consolidated its stand in 
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the Gulf, simultaneously releasing Iranians from the economic dependency on 
the West (Detaly 2019).
One of the new trends is the growth of regional security cooperation within 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Iran, having now the status 
of an observer in this organization, has all rights and prerequisites to become 
a member-state in the future. Owing to realization of the renewed SCO anti-
narcotic strategy, more than 40 percent of the drugs substances were seized in 
the territory of Eurasia during the last five years. In 2018, alone, the SCO states 
put an end to 360 terroristic crimes, liquidated approximately 70 militants, and 
reduced the access to more than 160 thousand sites, including those which have a 
terroristic and extremist character (Podrobno.uz 2019b). 
In this sense inclusion of India and Pakistan into the SCO ranks has 
significantly increased its potential in counteracting present challenges and threats. 
Now SCO joins nearly half of the world population. It is worth mentioning that 
since May 23, 2004, Tashkent has hosted the SCO Regional Anti-Terroristic 
Center, and since January 2019, the Former Director of the Institute of Strategic 
Studies of Uzbekistan, Vladimir Norov, is the Secretary-General of the SCO.
So, we can observe positive dynamics of the regional cooperation that will 
certainly contribute to further consolidation of the Iran-Uzbekistan ties, as they 
are evolving within these regional formations and various unions of economic 
and security partners. This is already contributing to the process of establishing 
regional peace and stability, and achieving better mutual understanding which 
are necessary for developing bilateral partnership.
Positive Opportunities for the Future
There are some other positive tendencies observed, which can further strengthen 
these mentioned achievements, and boost Iran-Uzbekistan cooperation. Some 
signals from Washington can indicate its intentions to attempt to pacify and 
reconcile the whole region of the Middle East, Central and South Asia in future.
First, the United States has not fully ceased cooperation on security issues 
with all regional actors, including its main adversaries, i.e. Russia and China, 
as well as, all Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, a close partner of the 
United States on Afghanistan. It periodically negotiates with each of these and 
other states to come to a consensus over current issues in the region. Apparent 
American pragmatism and rational thinking on security issues can lead to some 
stability and peace in the region, indicating Washington’s unwillingness to object 
strongly to Uzbekistan-Iran cooperation. Even the United States is forced to 
acknowledge the existing regional realities.
Second, the trend for regional stability can also be seen in evolution of 
the U.S.-Uzbekistan relations. Washington activates its policy regarding the 
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strategically located Uzbekistan. Its assistance to this key Central Asian state grew 
to approximately US$ 28.1 million in fiscal year 2018, from US$ 10.1 million in 
fiscal year 2016 (U.S. Embassy in Uzbekistan 2019).
Third, to provide the United States with a positive image and fulfill the 
regional promises on reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, the U.S. 
State Department issued a waiver for Iran-India project on Chabahar. It seems 
that these tendencies not only contradict the policy of the regional war due to 
the closeness of Iran to Central Asia, but also presuppose regional connectivity 
among all pacified neighbors in the future.
Simultaneously, the European Union approved on June 17, 2019 the new 
EU Strategy for Central Asia under the sub-heading “New Opportunities 
for a Stronger Partnership,” that not only fully complies with the priorities of 
Uzbekistan Development Strategy for 2017-2021, but apparently includes Iran 
in their regional plans. The three European signatories to the Iranian nuclear 
deal reiterated their commitment to the JCPOA’s implementation, saying that 
they will keep looking for solutions to stop the deal from unravelling and they 
will continue active engagement with all interested parties, in the interest of the 
preservation of international peace and security (IRNA 2019d).
Meanwhile, Iran proposed a new initiative called the “Ormuz peaceful 
initiative” to provide, among other things, security of energy and free oil 
transportation via Ormuz strait (Tehran Times 2019b). Moscow, in its own way, 
is preparing security doctrine for the Persian Gulf based on the international 
agreements till the end of 2019 (Tehran Times 2019a).
Pakistan intends to expand trade ties with Iran (IRNA 2019a) and complete 
the gas pipeline from Iran despite major hurdle created by the U.S. sanctions on 
Iran-Pakistan banking ties; Iran in its own side wants to settle its differences with 
Saudi Arabia with assistance of Islamabad. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan 
has recently met with both Iranian and Saudi officials in a bid to find a middle 
ground to bring the two regional powers to the negotiating table (IRNA 2019e).
Conclusion
Thus, the situation is very complicated, but not necessarily prone to a new 
military conflict. It is clear that neither the United States nor Iran is interested 
in war—they have too many economic and political stakes in the vast region of 
the Middle East and Central and South Asia. It seems, pragmatic U.S. President 
Trump simply wants Tehran to initiate new negotiations on the terms acceptable 
for the United States and its new tactic of “great power competition” in the 
Middle East and South Asia.
Meanwhile, Uzbekistan proceeds with the realization of the vitally important 
transport-transit and energy projects that shows that it is not inclined to fully 
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observe the United States’ instructions on Iran, risking the detriment of its own 
economy and security interests. In fact, American business interests also demand 
the construction of the regional transport network. They also seek stability and 
peace as well as positive capital flow in the region.
It is also clear that Iran’s incremental withdrawals from the JCPOA are 
a calculated response to the unprecedented sanctions pressure, allowing Iran 
to resolutely reciprocate, while creating some leverage for potential future 
negotiations. Iran’s government is betting that it can withstand a weakened 
economy and the increasing likelihood of a military conflict, but that depends on 
whether the European Union, Russia, and China can offer economic and security 
lifelines or not. 
It is obvious that there is no way to avoid or at least to restrain the existing 
regional problems and achieve the projected results except to enter into dialogue 
and organize mutually beneficial economic cooperation. In this sense, Tashkent 
supports Iran’s stance on the development of collective regional security and 
talks.
Through such talks, Iran and Uzbekistan would be able to participate in 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations to reduce geopolitical tensions with the 
United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others. They could arrange fruitful 
cooperation based on their common interest. For instance, they would be able to 
initiate cooperation in their transport and transit projects. It is expedient within 
this framework to proceed with completing the Chabahar project in the territory 
of Afghanistan (routes to Mazari-Sharif-Gerat), the North-South corridor, the 
Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman transport corridor, as well as the China-
Tajikistan-Uzbekistan highway bound for Turkmenistan and Iran. 
Additionally, both states would receive the opportunity to cooperate 
multilaterally in the schemes of possibly attracting Iran to the recently initiated 
“road map” of the actions of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group in the security 
sphere.
Today much depends on how efficiently Iran and Uzbekistan can respond to 
the existing geopolitical and economic risks—the key geopolitical risk is still the 
U.S. economic sanctions against Iran.
Notes
1.  “Eurasian” here means on the Eurasian continent.
2.  INSTEX stands for the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, a European 
special-purpose vehicle, established in January 2019, to facilitate non-USD transactions to 
avoid breaking U.S. sanctions.
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